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Abstract
The paper reports from an experiment studying how the aversion to lying is
affected by non-economic dimensions of the choice situation. Specifically, we
study whether people are more or less likely to lie when the content of the lie is
personal, when they base decisions on intuition, and when they are in a market
context. We also study how aversion to lying depends on personal characteristics,
including age, gender, cognitive ability, personality and social preferences. Our
main finding is that non-economic aspects of the choice situation are crucial in
understanding aversion to lying. In particular, we find that people are less likely
to lie when the content of the message is personal. We also find large effects
from priming the participants to rely on intuition, but, interestingly, in this case
the effect only applies to males. Finally, we find that people who are highly mo-
tivated by social preferences are more averse to lying, but there is no significant
relationship between lying behavior and other personal characteristics.
JEL classification: D63.
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1 Introduction
It is often argued, in particular by moral philosophers, that it is bad to tell lies irrespec-
tive of the consequences of doing so. Immanuel Kant famously asserted that lying, or
deception of any kind, is forbidden in any circumstance and irrespective of the con-
sequences (Kant, 1949 [1785]). Since communication is a key element in almost all
social interaction, including in economic transactions, it is important to understand
when, and to what extent, people are motivated by such non-consequentialistic moral
reasoning.
A growing literature in economics has studied the prevalence of lying in differ-
ent economic environments and how it relates to other moral motives (Gneezy, 2005;
Dreber and Johannesson, 2008; Sa´nchez-Page´s and Vorsatz, 2009; Erat and Gneezy,
2012; Lo´pez-Pe´rez and Spiegelman, Forthcoming; Childs, 2012; Friesen and Gangad-
haran, 2012; Lundquist, Ellingsen, and Johannesson, Forthcoming).1 In particular,
Erat and Gneezy (2012) report experimental data showing that a substantial fraction of
people refuse to tell a lie that would be beneficial for all parties involved, referred to
as Pareto White Lies. Their design identifies a pure aversion to lying, since it is hard
to see that anything else can motivate not lying in such situations. At the same time,
they show that people are not strictly non-consequentialistic in their lying behavior, but
also take into account the economic consequences of lying and lie less when it hurts
themselves or others.
In this paper we examine how non-economic dimensions of the choice situation
affect the aversion to lying. More specifically, we examine whether people are more or
less averse to lying when the content of the lie is personal, when they base decisions
on intuition, and when they are in a market context. These aspects are potentially
of great importance when considering whether we should expect people to commu-
nicate the truth or not. For example, should an employer expect an employee whom
he knows to be truthful about personal issues also to be truthful when communicating
about non-personal issues? Should we trust the intuitive response of a politician more
than his reflective statements? Should universities expect more dishonesty from their
students if they view themselves as “customers in an educational market” rather than
as traditional students?2
In order to study how non-economic dimensions affect the aversion to lying, we
introduced four treatments in a sender-receiver game (Gneezy, 2005), which allows us
to identify the causal effect of changing the non-economic environment. A key ele-
ment in all four treatments is that it is beneficial for both the sender and the receiver
that the sender lies when sending the message to the receiver. The decision not to lie
1There is also a related important literature on dishonesty and promise breaking, including Brandts
and Charness (2003), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Sutter, Bosman, Kocher, and Winden (2009),
and Charness and Dufwenberg (2010).
2For a broader discussion of the implications of students taking the consumer perspective, see New
York Times, January 3, 2010 (http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/03/are-they-students-
or-customers/).
2
in this experiment thus reflects a pure aversion to lying that outweighs the beneficial
consequences of lying. In addition to the base treatment, we conducted three treat-
ments that each manipulated one non-economic aspect of the choice situation. In the
personal treatment, the content of the lie was personal (in contrast to the impersonal
nature of the lie in Erat and Gneezy (2012)), whereas in the intuition treatment and
the market treatment we used a priming sequence to capture the marginal behavioral
effect of being in a market context and relying on intuition, respectively. Finally, in
the experiment, we also collected information about gender, personality (measured
by the Big Five Inventory), cognitive ability (measured by the WAIS-IV Matrices),
and social preferences (measured by the share given in an independent dictator game).
This allows us to study whether the aversion to lying relates to important individual
characteristics.
A related literature on lying and moral motivation more generally suggests that
the three non-economic dimensions studied by our treatments could be important for
understanding aversion to lying. There is evidence showing that people lie less in
personal relationships (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, and Epstein, 1996; DePaulo and
Kashy, 1998; Chakravarty, Ma, and Maximiano, 2011), which may suggest that peo-
ple lie less when the content of the lie is personal. Lundquist et al. (Forthcoming)
find, in line with this, that individuals have an aversion towards lying about personal
information, but they do not compare this to a setting where people can lie about some-
thing impersonal. There is also some evidence suggesting that people might lie less
when relying on intuition. In particular, Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, and Co-
hen (2004) show that people rely less on calculations of costs and benefits when they
base their moral judgment on intuition rather than reasoning, which suggests that non-
consequentialistic considerations, like a pure aversion to lying, may play a larger role
when intuition is invoked. At the same time, Rand, Greene, and Nowak (Forthcoming)
show that intuition supports cooperation in social dilemma situations, which suggests
that the fact that lying benefits the other participant may pull in the direction of more
lying in the intuition treatment. Finally, several experiments have documented, by
the use of priming techniques, that the introduction of a market context increases the
weight people place on self-interest (Vohs, Mead, and Goode, 2006) and efficiency
(Al-Ubaydli, Houser, Nye, Paganelli, and Pan, 2011), which may imply that the aver-
sion to lying is given relatively less weight in a market setting where lying is beneficial
to everyone.
Our main finding is that non-economic aspects of the choice situation are crucial in
understanding aversion to lying. In fact, by manipulating the non-economic environ-
ment, we find effects of similar size as those established by manipulating the payoff
structure in Erat and Gneezy (2012). In particular, we find that the share of participants
lying drops by 20 percent when the content of the message is personal. We also find
large effects from priming the participants to rely on intuition, but, interestingly, in
this case the effect only applies to males; the share of male participants that lie drops
by almost 30 points in the intuition treatment, where only 50 percent of the males are
willing to lie even when doing so benefits both parties. Among the female participants,
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we do not see any effect of being primed to think intuitively. Finally, we do find a small
effect of the market priming making the participants likely to lie, but this effect is not
statistically significant.
Among the background variables, we find a close relationship between lying aver-
sion and pro-social behavior in the dictator game, where those who give a large share
in the dictator game are much less likely not to lie. Other personal characteristics have
little effect, and, interestingly, we do not find any gender difference on the overall level
of lying across the four treatments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental
design. Section 3 presents the results while section 4 concludes.
2 Design
We start out by describing the base treatment, before we detail the treatments manip-
ulating the non-economic aspects of the choice situation.3 Finally, we describe the
collection of background data, the experimental procedures, and the sample.
2.1 Base treatment
The base treatment is a version of the Pareto White Lies treatment in the sender-
receiver game in Erat and Gneezy (2012). At the beginning of the experiment the
participants are randomly assigned the role of sender or receiver. The computer then
rolls a six-sided dice and the sender, but not the receiver, is informed about the out-
come. The sender sends a message to the receiver about the outcome of the dice roll,
choosing between six possible messages of the type: “The outcome from the roll of
the six-sided die is X.” Obviously, only one of the six possible messages is true, and
the choice of message is thus a choice about whether or not to lie to the receiver.
Based on the message from the sender, the receiver then chooses a number from
1 to 6. If the receiver chooses the same number as the dice roll, they both receive
the same low payment (20 NOK, approximately 3.5 USD). If the receiver chooses
a different number than the dice roll, they both receive the same high payment (30
NOK). In addition, there is a penalty of 2 NOK paid by the receiver if he or she
chooses differently from the number communicated by the sender.4
Both the sender and the receiver are informed about the general rules of the game.
The complete payment structure, however, is only known to the sender. The receiver is
informed about the penalty for deviating and the fact that the payment to both of them
only depends on his or her choice.
Since the receiver has no reason to think that any other number is better, and he or
she furthermore knows that there is a penalty for deviating from the number commu-
3The complete instructions are provided in the appendix.
4This penalty was not a part of the design in Erat and Gneezy (2012), but introduced by us to make
it costly for the sender to make a random choice.
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nicated by the sender, the rational choice is to select this number. In turn, this implies
that the sender should lie if he or she is only concerned with the outcome from the
experiment, since both participants then receive a higher payment. This also applies
for participants who have distributional concerns, since the final outcome is an equal
split in both cases. Thus, there is no room for sophisticated deception through truth
telling (Sutter, 2009).
Prior to the introduction of the sender-receiver game, all participants are asked to
spend five minutes writing a text about what it is to live in Bergen (the city where the
experiment took place). We introduce the text-phase in the base treatment to ensure
that the variation across treatments is in the topic given to them in the text-phase and
not in the presence of a text-phase. We consider the topic of the base treatment a
neutral manipulation, since we fail to see that the writing of such a text should affect
behavior in the sender-receiver game in a systematic manner.5
2.2 Treatment manipulations
In order to study non-economic dimensions of the choice situation, we manipulate the
text-writing phase for the senders, whereas the receivers in all treatments write about
how it is to live in Bergen.
To study whether the impersonal nature of the lie matters, we implemented a per-
sonal treatment where people are given the opportunity to lie about something per-
sonal. The lie in the base treatment is clearly impersonal in nature, the participants
are only given the opportunity to lie about the roll of a dice. The introduction of a
personal lie is not entirely straightforward in the present design, since a message about
something personal (true or false) could affect the behavior of the receiver. For exam-
ple, if the message revealed a personal characteristic of the sender, then the receiver
might have a preference for rewarding or punishing the sender on the basis of this per-
sonal characteristic. This would introduce a new dimension to the sender’s decision of
whether to lie or not, and we would no longer be able to uniquely identify an aversion
to lying.
To avoid this problem, we use the text-writing phase to randomly assign a task to
each sender. Specifically, the sender is told the outcome of the roll of the dice, and then
asked to spend five minutes writing about this number. They are then asked to send a
message of the following kind: “The outcome from the roll of the six-sided dice is X
and I spent five minutes writing about this number.”6 If the sender decides not to tell
5This is an example of a text written in the base treatment: “Bergen is not so rainy as they say. The
weather is changing, but is nothing to worry about. The people are more welcoming than in other places
I’ve been to in Norway, they take pride in their city. But unfortunately I have not met a lot of them.
Bergen is a student city and the streets, buses, nightclubs etc. are filled with them. Overall Bergen is a
nice and exiting place to live.”
6This is an examples of a text written in the intuition treatment: “Situations related to the number 4
are for instance when I take busline number 4. I guess it is the number of swingstates the Republicans
are trying to win from Obama in the election as well, Ohio, Wisconsin, Connecticut, and Florida? I think
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the truth in this case, he or she has to lie about something personal, namely what he or
she has been doing the last five minutes. At the same time, since the roll of the dice
is random, the lie does not reveal any personal characterizes of the sender. In all other
respects, the personal treatment is identical to the base treatment.
To study the effect on lying of relying on intuition or being in a market context,
we prime the individuals by the topic given to them in the text-writing phase. In the
intuition treatment, the senders are asked to spend five minutes describing a situation
where they had benefited from trusting their intuition, whereas in the market treatment
they were asked to spend five minutes describing a situation in which they benefited
from buying or selling a good or a service.7 Thus, in the intuition treatment they have
to think about a situation were they relied on intuition, and in the market treatment
they have to think about a situation where they were in a market context.8 In all other
respects, the intuition and market treatments are identical to the base treatment. In
particular, in these two treatments, the message is impersonal and the sender only
communicates the roll of the dice. This design therefore allows us to capture the
marginal behavioral effect of relying on intuition or being in a market context without
changing any feature of the actual sender-receiver game.
2.3 Background data
In an independent experiment conducted before the sender-receiver game, but in the
same session, all participants took part in a version of the dictator game where they
were asked to distribute 200 NOK between themselves and another participant. The
share given to the other participant in this experiment provides us with a measure of
the participants’ pro-social preferences.
After the sender-receiver game, the participants were given the opportunity to write
a paragraph on what motivated their choices. This provides us both with a test of
whether any of the treatments generated an experimenter demand effect and also some
about the media, often referred to as the forth pillar of the state, along with parliament, government and
courts. July fourth is also a national holiday in the US.”
7In the intuition treatment, we adopt the conceptual priming manipulation of Rand et al. (Forthcom-
ing). An alternative approach to studying how people behave when they rely on intuition would have
been to give the participants in the intuition treatment a limited time to decide on what message to send.
However, such a design would have created a confound between intuition and understanding of the ex-
periment, since it could have been the case that participants who had less time to decide which message
to send would have been less likely to understand that lying would result in the best outcome.
8We here provide two examples: “I feel I have benefitted from most situations where I have trusted
my gut. For example when I was walking home from a club in Oslo a couple of weeks ago. It was
late. My intuition was telling me that I should not take the usual shortcut. The next morning I read in
the newspaper that a guy had been robbed.” (intuition treatment); “I was selling my old computer, a
MacBook Air, because I wanted to buy a new one. The computer was only 6 months old, and the buyer
didn’t need a new computer from the store, so he was happy with the purchase, which I offered to him
for a reasonable price. In the end, we both came out happy. He had a computer in perfect shape at a
very good price and I had money to spend on a new computer. It was a win-win situation, I’d be happy
to do it again” (market treatment).
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further understanding of the role of different possible motives. None of the participants
reported anything that indicated an experimenter demand effect, but many participants
highlighted both the ethical and selfish dimensions involved in the situation.
In the final part of the experiment, the participants answered the 44-item Big Five
Inventory (John, Donahue, and Kentle, 1991; Benet-Martı´nez and John, 1998). All
participants were also asked to complete the WAIS-IV matrix reasoning test (Wechsler,
2008), which uses 26 questions to measure non-verbal abstract problem solving.
2.4 Procedures and sample
We recruited participants among first-year students at the Norwegian School of Eco-
nomics, where a total of 352 subjects participated in 13 sessions. Table 1 provides an
overview of the background characteristics of the participants. We observe that the
sample is fairly balanced with respect to gender, and that the average participant is
about 20 years old. There is relatively little variation in the age and cognitive ability
score, which reflects that these are all students at the same business school. The varia-
tion in the personality dimensions is in line with in line with what is typically observed
in student samples. The average share given in the dictator game was 0.292, which is
similar to what is observed in earlier dictator games (Engel, 2011).
[ Table 1 about here. ]
The experiment was conducted in a computer lab using web-based interface and
was double blind, i.e., neither subjects nor experimenters could associate decisions
with particular subjects. At the beginning of the experiment, the participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of the four treatments. Each sender took only part in one game,
while each receiver took part in, on average, four games (with a different sender in
each game). All payments were made in cash immediately after the experiment. Spe-
cial care was taken so that the payment procedure ensured anonymity. The computer
assigned a payment code to each of the participants, and a group of assistants who
were not present in the lab during the experiment prepared envelopes containing the
payments corresponding to each payment code. After bringing the envelopes to the
lab, the assistants immediately left and the envelopes were handed out in accordance
with the payment codes. This procedure was explained to all participants at the start
the experiment.
3 Results
We find that a significant share of the senders, 36 percent, decided to send a true
message to the receiver. The large majority of receivers, 71 percent, chose the number
communicated by the sender, which implies that lying increased the expected gain
both for the sender and the receiver. This confirms the finding in Erat and Gneezy
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(2012) that a substantial fraction of people have a pure aversion to lie, and therefore
tells the truth even when lying benefits both parties. The importance of honesty was
also highlighted by many participants when describing what motivated their choices,
as illustrated by the following quote: “Deception shows lack of integrity, and I will not
sell out my integrity.”
3.1 Analysis of treatment differences
The experimental design allows us to study the causal effect on lying behavior of
manipulating different non-economic aspects of the choice situation. The share of
participants lying in each of the four treatments is reported in Figure 1, where we
observe important differences across treatments. In the base treatment, 69.1 percent of
the participants send a false message. This share drops substantially by more than 20
percent in the personal treatment, from 69.1 percent to 55.2 percent, when people have
to make a choice between telling the truth or making a personal lie. A similar drop is
observed in the intuition treatment, where people were primed to rely on intuition when
making the decision of whether or not lie; in this case, 42 percent of the participants
decide to send a true message. In contrast, the highest share of participants lying, 72.3
percent, is observed in the market treatment.
[ Figure 1 about here.]
Table 2 shows that the average treatment effect of introducing a personal lie is
statistically significant (when compared to the base treatment), also when controlling
for background characteristics of the participants (p-0.078). The two other average
treatment effects are in the predicted direction relative to the base treatment, but not
statistically significant (p = 0.18 for the intuition treatment; p = 0.69 for the market
treatment). Overall, we observe that controlling for background variables has little
effect on the estimated average treatment effects.
[ Table 2 about here. ]
Table 2 also reports how the propensity to lie depends on personal characteristics.
We observe that the measure of social preferences is strongly related to lying behavior
(p = 0.01), where participants who are more motivated to give in the dictator game
also are more likely not to lie in the sender-receiver game. The estimated marginal
effect implies that the share of people who lie among those who take everything in the
dictator game is 15 percentage points higher than among those who split equally. This
finding is far from obvious. Pro-social participants have an additional argument for
lying in the sender-receiver game relative to a purely selfish participant, since lying
benefits both participants, but they are still more likely to tell the truth. This suggests
that aversion to lying not only is positively associated with pro-social preferences, but
for many a stronger moral motive than the concern for the welfare of others.
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The propensity to lie is not statistically significantly associated with any of the
other background characteristics. In particular, we do not observe a statistically
significant gender difference (p = 0.53), which is in contrast to the previous liter-
ature showing that females are less likely to tell both Pareto White Lies (Erat and
Gneezy, 2012) and lies that benefit themselves and hurt others (Dreber and Johannes-
son, 2008; Friesen and Gangadharan, 2012), In fact, in the present experiment, females
are slightly more likely to lie than males; 65.6 percent versus 61.9 percent. We also
observe that age, cognitive ability, and personality are not significantly related to lying
behavior.
3.2 Heterogeneity in treatment effects
We here consider whether there are heterogenous treatment effects in our sample,
where we focus on gender, since there is an extensive literature showing that males and
females often respond differently to experimental manipulations (Croson and Gneezy,
2009), including in studies of lying behavior (Dreber and Johannesson, 2008; Erat and
Gneezy, 2012; Friesen and Gangadharan, 2012).
Table 2 reports regression for the three non-economic treatments (compared to the
base treatment), where we have included an interaction effect between gender and
treatment status.
[ Table 3 about here. ]
We do not observe a statistically significant treatment difference between males
and females. Still, the table illuminates that the intuition treatment had a very strong
and statistically significant effect on the male participants (p= 0.05), with an estimated
reduction in the share of male participants lying of 26.5 percentage points. In contrast,
the intuition treatment had almost no effect on the females. One possible interpretation
of this result is that males are less likely to rely on intuition in decision making than
females (Frederick, 2005), and that the effect of the priming therefore is larger for
males (Benjamin, Choi, and Strickland, 2010).
4 Conclusion
We have shown that non-economic aspects can be as important as economic incen-
tives in determining lying behavior. This finding is striking, since our manipulations
of the non-economic aspects are extremely weak. In particular, we introduce a very
innocent personal element in the communication, but still it substantially reduces peo-
ple’s willingness to lie. This may suggest that people often come close to the Kantian
non-consequentialistic ideal in the personal sphere and other contexts where personal
issues are involved.
Similarly, we have shown that a slight priming of males to think in intuitive terms
causes substantially less lying. Rand et al. (Forthcoming) show that intuition fosters
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cooperation in a public good game, suggesting that we should observe more lying in
the intuition treatment since it is beneficial to both parties. In contrast, intuition sup-
ports honesty at the cost of overall welfare in the present experiment. The importance
of lying aversion relative to a concern for others’ welfare is also illustrated by the fact
that the participants who gave away a large share in the dictator game are much less
likely not to lie in the sender-receiver game. Overall, the study therefore provides ev-
idence of aversion to lying being a fundamental part of the human moral psychology,
but more research is needed on how this motive interacts with other moral motives in
different economic and non-economic environments.
People’s aversion to lying is potentially of great importance for public policy. In
particular, the effectiveness of the welfare state depends on truthful reporting of infor-
mation both in the collection of taxes and in the distribution welfare benefits, and thus
it is crucial for the optimal design of welfare policies to know when people lie.
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Figure 1: Share of participants lying
Note: The figure reports the share of participants who lied in each of the four treat-
ments, with the corresponding standard errors.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
mean sd
age 20.426 2.167
female 0.443 0.497
points on WAIS-IV test 21.778 2.424
Big-5 Agreeableness 0.618 0.396
Big-5 Conscientiousness 0.649 0.417
Big-5 Extraversion 0.362 0.534
Big-5 Neuroticism -0.421 0.558
Big-5 Openness 0.176 0.513
share given 0.292 0.235
Observations 352
Note: “age” (in years) and “female” (an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the par-
ticipant is a female) are self-reported at the end of the experiment. The maximum score
possible on WAIS-IV matrix reasoning test is 26 points. The personality measures are
from the 44-item Big Five Inventory, and calculated using the “ipsatizing” method of
John, Naumann, and Soto (2008). One participant (a receiver) did not provide data on
the Big Five measures. “share given” is the share of 200 NOK that the participant gave
to another random and anonymous participant in the dictator game in the experiment.
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Table 2: Average treatment effects on lying (relative to base treatment).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
personal -0.139+ -0.156+ -0.140+ -0.142+ -0.142+ -0.153+
(0.083) (0.084) (0.083) (0.084) (0.084) (0.087)
intuition -0.111 -0.118 -0.111 -0.112 -0.110 -0.115
(0.082) (0.084) (0.083) (0.083) (0.084) (0.085)
market 0.032 0.045 0.036 0.035 0.037 0.048
(0.079) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.090)
share given -0.329∗∗ -0.326∗∗
(0.125) (0.126)
age 0.007 0.011
(0.013) (0.012)
female 0.036 0.043
(0.060) (0.069)
points on WAIS-IV test 0.000 0.001
(0.012) (0.012)
Big-5 Agreeableness -0.070 -0.050
(0.078) (0.082)
Big-5 Conscientiousness 0.041 0.047
(0.071) (0.080)
Big-5 Extraversion 0.022 0.003
(0.059) (0.058)
Big-5 Neuroticism 0.005 -0.006
(0.056) (0.064)
Big-5 Openness -0.028 -0.012
(0.060) (0.062)
Constant 0.691∗∗
(0.056)
Observations 269 269 269 269 269 269
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p< 0.1, ∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: The table reports average treatment effects on lying, where the dependent vari-
able is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the sender lied. Column (1) reports
OLS results, columns (2)-(6) report logit marginal effects. “personal”, “intuition”, and
“market’ are indicator variables taking the value 1 if the participant was assigned to
this treatment. “age” (in years) and “female” (an indicator variable taking the value
1 if the participant is a female) are self-reported at the end of the experiment. The
maximum score possible on the WAIS-IV matrix reasoning test is 26 points. The per-
sonality measures are from the 44-item Big Five Inventory, and calculated using the
“ipsatizing” method of John et al. (2008). “share given” is the share of 200 NOK
that the participant gave to another random and anonymous participant in the dictator
game in the experiment. Also included, but not reported, is an indicator for whether
the participant took part in a session in February or August, 2012.
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Table 3: Heterogeneous treatment effects on lying for males and females
Personal Intuition Market
treated -0.116 -0.265∗ 0.038
(0.123) (0.127) (0.114)
treated interacted with female -0.078 0.253 -0.006
(0.183) (0.184) (0.164)
female -0.009 -0.085 -0.046
(0.140) (0.141) (0.126)
Treatment effect on females -0.195 -0.012 0.032
(0.133) (0.128) (0.117)
Observations 135 137 133
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p< 0.10, ∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: The table reports logit marginal effects on lying, where the dependent variable
is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the sender lied. We report separate regres-
sions for each of the three treatments relative to base treatment. “treated” is an indica-
tor variable taking the value 0 if the participant is assigned to the base treatment and
the value 1 if the participant is assigned to the relevant alternative treatment. Also in-
cluded in the regressions, but not reported, are the background variables: Age, female,
points on the WAIS-IV matrix reasoning testability score, Big-5 personality measures,
share given in the dictator game, and an indicator for whether the participant took part
in a session conducted in February or August, 2012.
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Appendix with screenshots for
“When do we lie?”
Alexander W. Cappelen Erik Ø. Sørensen
Bertil Tungodden
August 31, 2012
This document shows the screenshots from the experiment in “When do you
lie”. Since the experiment was conducted using a web platform, actual layout
on participant’s computers could vary depending on the magnification (user ad-
justible) and screen resolutions.
Throughout the experiment there were no instructions read to the participants
except an encouragement to follow the instructions on screen.
All treatments were allocated randomly within sessions.
1 Priming sequence
All participants were allocated to write one of four texts: “life in Bergen”, “per-
sonal”, “intuition” or “market”, Figures 1-4 shows screenshots of this.
2 Sending messages
After all participants had been working on their texts for 5 minutes, they were
given the task of sending messages. Some of the those who had written “life in
Bergen” texts were allocated to being receivers of the message, and they were told
to await further instructions while the messages were sent.
There were separate screens for those in the personal (Figure 5) and in the
non-personal treatments (Figure 6).
1
3 Receiving messages
When all the message senders had finished sending their messages, they were
asked to report on their motivation (Figure 7).
Those allocated to receiving messages and making choices did so facing screen-
shots such as Figure 8 for the personal and 9 for the non-personal treatments.
When receivers had made their choices, they were also asked to report on their
motivation (Figure 7).
2
Life in Bergen
In this part of the experiment, we would ﬁrst like you to spend ﬁve minutes
describing how it is to live in Bergen.
Please work carefully and continuously on the text. After ﬁve minutes, your
text will automatically be submitted and you will be taken to the next screen.
Enter text here: 43.5
Copyright Department of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics.
Figure 1: Writing text, neutral treatment
3
Practical task
In this part of the experiment, the computer has rolled a 6-sided die and
obtained the outcome 2. Please spend ﬁve minutes describing situations that
are related to the number 2.
Please work carefully and continuously on the text. After ﬁve minutes, your
text will automatically be submitted and you will be taken to the next screen.
Enter text here: 40.1
Copyright Department of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics.
Figure 2: Writing text, personal treatment
4
Trusted my intuition
In this part of the experiment, we would ﬁrst like you to spend ﬁve minutes
describing a situation where you beneﬁtted from trusting your intuition.
Please work carefully and continuously on the text. After ﬁve minutes, your
text will automatically be submitted and you will be taken to the next screen.
Enter text here: 42.8
Copyright Department of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics.
Figure 3: Writing text, intuition treatment
5
A great trade
In this part of the experiment, we would ﬁrst like you to spend ﬁve minutes
describing a situation where you beneﬁtted from buying or selling a good or
a service.
Please work carefully and continuously on the text. After ﬁve minutes, your
text will automatically be submitted and you will be taken to the next screen.
Enter text here: 43.6
Copyright Department of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics.
Figure 4: Writing text, market treatment
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Enter text here:
Submit Query
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Figure 7: Screen for entering motivations
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